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CASE NOTES
states approve such a plan, multiple taxation would still result. Perhaps the
only feasible solution would be federal action, and this is currently being
considered.'
PAUL G. GARRITY
Contracts—Federal Arbitration Act--Severability of Arbitration
Clause.—El Hoss Engineering eff Transport Co. v. American Independ-
ent Oil Co.'—EI Hoss Engineering & Transport Co. (El Hoss), a Lebanese
corporation with its principal place of business in Lebanon, entered into
an agreement with American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil), a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New York City. Under
the terms of the agreement Aminoil was to sell to El Hoss automotive and
construction equipment and El Hoss was to lease this same and other equip-
ment to Aminoil, and furnish such transportation as Aminoil would need.
Immediately preceding the signature of Aminoil's agent was the following
clause:
"and accepted by the Company this 1st day of October, 1959,
subject to compliance with the conditions of this agreement as to
guarantees or endorsements by third parties in favor of the Com-
pany covering the unpaid installments on purchase price, perform-
ance bonds and insurance coverage, etc., not later than fourteen (14)
days from the date of the acceptance by the Company."
The agreement included a standard arbitration clause. 2
Aminoil extended the time for the posting of the performance bond
and insurance from October 14 to November 1, and then to November 20,
as it and El Hoss were negotiating with regard to same. Then in December,
El floss filed a petition under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Ace to
compel arbitration as to the terms and suitability of the performance bonds
and insurance which it was prepared to furnish. The petition was granted, 4
17 Pub. L. No. 86-272, § 201, 73 Stat. 556 (Sept. 14, 1959). Congress directed the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on the Judiciary to hold hear-
ings and report proposed legislation to provide uniform standards to be observed by
the states.
1 289 F.2d 346 (1961), petition for cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. Week 3026 (U.S. July 6,
1961) (no. 209).
2 "11. In the event of any disagreement between the parties hereto as to the
effectuation of this agreement, or performance thereof, or any part of the
agreement, each party undertakes to use its best efforts to resolve said disagree-
ment without submission to arbitration, However, should such solution be
impossible, the parties hereto will select a mutually acceptable arbitrator whose
decision as to the matters presented to him shall be final. If the parties cannot
agree on such an arbitrator, each shall nominate an arbitrator of its choice and
these shall in turn select a third, and the decision of a majority of this panel of
three shall be final as to all matters submitted. This paragraph shall not effect
the rights of the company to terminate this agreement under the provisions of
paragraphs three (3) and four (4) of section one (1)" Supra note 1, at 348.
3 61 Stat. 671 (1947), as amended, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
4 183 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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but on appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the order
and remanded the case to the District Court. HELD: The issue as to the
performance bond and insurance is not arbitrable as the arbitration clause
is not separable from the remainder of the agreement.
At common law, arbitration agreements were considered to be collateral
to the main contract. 5 The courts exemplified this position by allowing a
party to avoid the agreement to arbitrate and proceed directly to an action
on the contract itself—they were deemed severable at will. 6 In order to
overcome this judicial hostility to arbitration various jurisdictions passed
arbitration laws.? But even though the arbitration clauses by virtue of such
statutes were deemed valid and irrevocable,' judicial restraint remained
evident. The generally accepted approach was for the courts to decide
whether or not the main contract was entered into. Such a ruling was
considered an indispensable prerequisite to an order compelling arbitration;'
the reason being that the agreement to arbitrate was considered a com-
ponent part of the main contract. Thus, if the main contract failed for any
reason, so too did the arbitration agreement!'
It was in this light that Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc." was presented. The problem before the court in that case was whether
or not an action could be brought for fraudulent inducement of a contract
which contained an arbitration clause. It was there decided that the Federal
Arbitration Act necessitated the application of federal rather than state law."
5
 Hamilton v. Home Insurance Co., 137 U.S. 370 (1890).
United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006
(S.D.N.Y. 1915).
7
 The Federal Arbitration Act was originally enacted in 1925. 43 Stat. 833 (1925),
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15. it was repealed and substantially re-enacted in 1947. 61 Stat. 669
(1947), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958). N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act. §§ 1448-69. The New York
Arbitration Act was originally enacted in 1925. L. 1925, c. 925. See also Kulukundis
Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).
8
 Heyman v. Darwin's Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356; Fernandez v. Golodetz, 148 F.2d
625 (2d Cir. 1945); Seymour Grean & Co. v. Grean, 274 App. Div. 898, 82 N.Y.S.2d
787 (1948).
9 "Even if, for some purposes, the provision for arbitration is declared to be
independent and collateral, the factor that makes the rest of the transaction void
or voidable would affect that transaction as a whole. If one party failed to
express assent to the terms proposed by the other, no contract has been made.
The proposal for arbitration lacks acceptance just as fully as do the other pro-
posed terms."
6 Corbin, Contracts § 1444 (1951).
10 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), dismissed, 364
U.S. 801 (1960).
11 On this point there is disagreement among the federal courts. Rose v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 236 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1956), and Lummus v. Common-
wealth Oil Refining Co., 280 F.2d 915, 924 (1st Cir. 1960), both hold that applicable
state law must govern. American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson CA.B., 269
F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959), takes an intermediate view, as there decided was the point
that both state and federal law should apply. The source of this confusion lies with
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Erie v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938); and Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). See
also Kochery, The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts: Erie v.
Tompkins, 39 Cornell L.Q. 74 (1953); Sturges, Some Confusing Matters Relating to
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And as under federal law an arbitration clause is deemed separable, a general
allegation of fraudulent inducement is not a sufficient basis for an action at
law, if the arbitration clause is broad enough to encompass such a charge. 12
To reach this conclusion, as to the separability of the arbitration clause, re-
liance was placed on three points: (1) Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act made "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" only the provision dealing
with arbitration; it does not apply to the contract in toto; 13 (2) at common
law such clauses were treated as separable; and (3) public policy favored
arbitration.14
It was this issue of separability which the court in the instant case met
head on. Robert Lawrence was distinguished on the ground that there the
allegation of fraud in the inducement applied only to the contract as a whole
and not to the arbitration clause, whereas in the instant case enjoyment of
the contractual rights and liabilities was subject to the posting of the
performance bond and liability insurance. "Every clause including the arbi-
tration clause was expressly so conditioned." 1¢ What the court does not
explain is why an allegation of fraudulent inducement of the whole contract
tends to show that the arbitration clause is separable, when an allegation
that a condition precedent to the contract was not met shows that the arbi-
tration clause is not separable.
The decision of the court was characterized in the dissenting opinion as
"an undesirable departure from the liberal arbitration policy enunciated by
this court in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.'" What the
court here did consider, and what it did not in Robert Lawrence, was the
over all intent of the parties: does the tenor of the whole contract, including
any part thereof should be treated as valid for any or all reasons? On the
other hand, the court in Robert Lawrence held in effect that under federal
law there is a presumption that the arbitration clause is separable."
Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 580
(1953) ; Note, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 915 (1960).
12 The arbitration clause appearing in Robert Lawrence read as follows:
"Any complaint, controversy, or question which may arise with respect to this
contract that cannot be settled by the parties thereto, shall be referred to arbi-
tration. If the controversy concerns the condition or quality of merchandise it
shall be referred to the Mutual Adjustment Bureau of the cloth and garment
trades pursuant to the rules and regulations thereof. All other controversies shall
be submitted to the American Arbitration Association."
Supra note 10, at 404.
13 61 Stat. 670 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). Section 2 reads as follows:
". . . a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy there-
after arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable
and enforceable save on such grounds as exist in law or equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract."
14 Supra note 10, at 409-10.
16 Supra note 1, at 349. It should be again noted that the clause stating this
condition appeared only once in the contract. The court also summarily stated that
"here there is no likelihood of sham litigation to avoid submitting issues to arbitration."
Ibid.
16 Id. at 351.
IT This approach was earlier proposed by Sturges, Fraudulent Inducement as a
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In Lummus v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.,'s the court dismissed the
contention of the plaintiff that, if it were to apply federal law, it would have
to find that the agreement to arbitrate was an integral part of the whole
contract. "We see no reason why parties should not agree, if they wish to,
that if a question arises as to whether the principal agreement was obtained
by fraud, that that question will be arbitrated. For a court then to hold that
fraud which bore only upon the principal agreement automatically invalidated
the arbitration contract would be to destroy precisely what the parties had
sought to create. Moreover, any other approach sets the stage for delaying
action . . . ."13
 It would seem that here the court adopts a criterion similar
to that of the instant case—the intent of the parties as exemplified by the
tenor of the whole contract. 2°
In In re Exercycle Corporation and Maratta, 21
 the New York Court of
Appeals held that the question of whether or not a contract was illusory was
arbitrable. It did not advert in any manner to the doctrine of separability,
though by reason of its decision it had to find that the arbitration clause was
separable.22
 The court also stated that if the objection raised was one of
fraud, duress, illegality, or failure of a condition precedent such would
not be arbitrable.23
Exercycle points up the problem presented by the court in the instant
case. If the test of separability is the intent of the parties, will the result
reached vary with the objection raised to the main contract? Do the objec-
tions of fraud in the inducement or lack of mutuality pose any greater reason
to find that the clause is separable than if the objection raised is one of an
unfulfilled condition precedent, lack of capacity or illegality? If uniformity of
result is a worthy attribute when federal law is applied, then the approach
of the court in Robert Lawrence, and not that in El floss, is to be favored.
ROBERT J. MARTIN
Defense to the Enforcement of Arbirtation Contracts, 36 Yale L.J. 866, 873 (1927). See
also Parsell, Arbitration of Fraud in the Inducement of a Contract, 12 Cornell L.Q. 351
(1927). In Robert Lawrence it was not alleged that the parties considered the arbitra-
tion clause as an inseparable part of the whole. It is submitted that such an allegation
would have had no effect.
18 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 0960).
19 Id. at 924.
20 The subjunctive mood was here used as the court did not apply federal law but
rather state law (see note 11 supra) and according to its interpretation the doctrine of
separability was not recognized in New York.
21 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961).
22 If the court did not find first that the agreement to arbitrate was separable,
it would in effect be saying that the arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction to decide
whether or not there was an agreement to arbitrate. Or put in another way, even if it
is alleged that the agreement to arbitrate was void or voidable such would have to be
decided by the arbitrators. Even Robert Lawrence denies the validity of this position.
Supra note 10, at 411.
23 Supra note 21, 174 N.E.2d at 465, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
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